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Taking the Initiative:
Political Parties, Primary Elections, and the
Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Governance
GAVIN M. ROSE*

Then I don't suppose that tyranny evolves from any constitution other than
democracy .... 1
[T]hough a democracy is more liable to error than a monarch or a body of
nobles, the chances of its regaining the 2right path when once it has
acknowledged its mistake are greater also.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, electoral law has been cast to the forefront of both American
politics and American legal jurisprudence. Largely because ofthe perceived unfairness
of the 2000 presidential election, numerous states and localities have attempted, with
varying levels of success, radical transformations in their electoral processes: in 2002,
for example, San Francisco took the lead in electoral reform by enacting the innovation
known as instant-runoff voting;3 similarly, in 2004, citizens of Colorado sent to the
ballot box Amendment 36, which would have eradicated the traditional winner-take-all
system for presidential electors.4 These reforms, in stark contrast to most substantive
legislation, are noteworthy precisely because they affect not any one area of voter
intrigue, but the very process of choosing how to choose elected representatives.
This Note seeks to remove itself one additional step from the complexities of most
substantive law. It focuses instead on several of the innovations that have become
inextricably interwoven with the American system of political governance. The
relationships among elections, political parties, and the electorate itself creates legal

* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 2002,
University of California, Davis. I would like to thank Meredith E. Sanchez for her tireless efforts
as my right-hand woman, and for her love and support throughout the constant ebb and flow of
my sanity. In addition, the insights of Professor David Williams of the Indiana University
School of Law and Lisa Danetz and Brenda Wright of the National Voting Rights Institute
proved absolutely invaluable to the intellectual fortitude of this Note. Finally, Jacob Ricardo
Cox has always persisted in bringing a smile to my face.
1. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 234 (G.M.A. Grube trans., C.D.C. Reeve rev., Hackett Publishing
Co. 1992).
2. 1 ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMocRAcY INAMERICA 231 (Phillips Bradley ed., Francis
Bowen rev., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (Henry Reeve trans., 1835) (1835).
3. Steven Hill, Open Forum, S.F. Takes Lead with Instant-RunoffVoting, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Oct. 11, 2004, at B7.
4. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ANALYSIS OF THE
2004 BALLOT PROPOSALS, RESEARCH PUBLICATION No. 527-1, at 10-11 (2004), availableat
http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/ legdir/lcsstaffi2004/ballot/2004Bluebookforlntemet.PDF (last
visited Oct. 20, 2005).
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and political difficulties that have not yet been entirely addressed by our legal and
political institutions. While it is impossible to isolate the legal ramifications of this
relationship from the political consequences, it is the legal intricacies that form the
crux of this Note.
Over the past half century, the American political system has experienced a
dramatic influx of legislation passed through direct democracy. 5 The electorate as a
whole, through the populist innovations of the initiative and referendum, has become
willing to broach subjects too divisive for professional politicians or otherwise
unsuitable for the traditional legislative process. While these professional politicians
are frequently hesitant to reform the same electoral system that placed them in power,
the rest of the populace has not always been so timid. As election law-and potential
electoral reform-has come to comprise the subject matter of casual, intellectual, and
political discussion across the nation, it has also begun to occupy a place amongst the
vast array of topics proceeding directly to the ballot box.
Over the past decade, the voters of California have sent to the ballot box multiple
initiatives altering-or attempting to alter-the structure of primary elections within
the state.6 In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court declared the overall
constitutionality of the processes of direct democracy to be nonjusticiable. However, it
is the contention of this Note that certain legislation passed through the mechanism of
direct democracy poses unique difficulties for constitutional analysis, regardless of
whether the legislation would be constitutional if passed by the State legislature.
Specifically, the alteration of a political party's primary system via citizen initiativeas was the case with California's Propositions 198 and 62-works a constitutionally
problematic infringement on the rights of political parties.
Part I of this Note briefly traces the history of the initiative process. Part II then
details the United States Supreme Court's treatment of the initiative process and argues
that the Court need not always treat the constitutionality of this process as
nonjusticiable. Part III contends that there are some far-reaching circumstances in
which legislation may not be passed through a system of direct democracy. Part IV
then details the rights of political parties, most notably their First Amendment
guarantee of associational freedom as it applies to a party's right to control its internal
affairs and to determine the shape of its primary elections. And finally, Part V
identifies a complex interaction between political parties and the initiative process,
arguing that the reformation ofprimary elections--traditionally a party affair-may not
be compelled through direct initiative without potentially violating the guarantees of
the United States Constitution. While this Note focuses almost entirely on the legal
aspects of this dilemma, it is nonetheless important to acknowledge the fundamental
role that politics plays in the determination of any electoral scheme.

5. See, e.g., M. Dane Waters, Comments on the Initiative Industry: The New Kid on the
Block or an Old Friend?, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 571 (2004).
6. In 1996, Proposition 198 successfully, albeit temporarily, altered the structure of

California's primary elections. In 2004, Proposition 60 sought to indoctrinate the requirement
that each political party fielding a candidate at the primary election be guaranteed a place on the
general election ballot, and Proposition 62 attempted to create a nonpartisan primary system in
the state. For a more thorough discussion of this legislation and the legal consequences, see
infra notes 154-68 and accompanying text.
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE INITIATIVE
In the late nineteenth century, a Rhenish democrat named Moritz Rittinghausen
proposed a system of direct legislation by the people. 7 According to this system, the
citizenry was to be divided into sections, each containing a thousand inhabitants! Each
section would then meet at a pre-arranged location in order to elect a president, who
would preside over the section's intellectual discourse and eventually transmit any vote
to the higher authorities. 9 In the language of German sociologist Robert0 Michels, in
Rittinghausen's scheme "[t]he will of the majority would be decisive."'
While this particular system of direct democracy never materialized in the form of
an actual legislative proposal, similar procedures have been implemented in various
societies over the past millennia. In ancient times, Athenian democrats guaranteed to
the citizens of the grand city-state both the equal right of speech and the equal
participation of all citizens in the exercise of power;" referenda were used frequently
in Europe during the French Revolution and its immediate aftermath;' 2 and, much more
recently, several New England colonial-and then state-legislatures mandated that
certain legislation be passed only in town meetings, an exercise, of course, in direct
democracy.' 3 While direct democracy is neither unique to the American political
culture nor new to contemporary governance, the modem-day usage of the initiative
and referendum certainly represents direct democracy on a much grander scale than
most previous experiments.

7. ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL

TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 63 (Eden and Cedar Paul trans., Collier Books 1962)
(1915).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.After detailing a few of the intricacies of Rittinghausen's system, Michels
vehemently criticizes government by direct democracy: "The system here sketched is clear and
concise, and it might seem at the first glance that its practical application would involve no
serious difficulties. But if put to the test it would fail to fulfil the expectations of its creator." Id.
at 64. Michels argues first that this legislative system would fail largely because the masses are
overly susceptible to suggestion, to the dictates of eloquent oratory, and to panic. Id.at 64-65.
The resulting legislation would, therefore, be more "a manifestation of the pathology of the
crowd" than the corollary of intense communal deliberation. Id.Michels further suggests that
the masses are incompetent and otherwise ill-equipped to carry on the affairs of society through
direct democracy. Id.at 65-66. While these arguments are of immense philosophical value, their
importance to this Note is largely academic.
11. Jonathan Simon, FearlessSpeech in the Killing State: The Power of Capital Crime
Victim Speech, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1377, 1393-94 (2004). As early as 399 B.C., for example,
Socrates was convicted and sentenced by a jury of the 501 adult male citizens of Athens. See
PLATO, Apology, in THE TRIAL AND DEATH OF SOCRATES 21, 21 (G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett
Publishing Co. 1975).
12. Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuringthe Ballot Initiative:Procedures That
Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV.47, 54 (1995).

13. See DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED:

INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER

OF MONEY 23-24 (2000). In Massachusetts, for example, town meetings were required to place
on their agenda "any item supported by a petition of ten citizens." Id.at 23.
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After briefly tracing the birth of the modem initiative and referendum in America,
this section turns to the more recent proliferation of the processes.
A. Birth of the Initiative and Referendum

In an 1820 letter, Thomas Jefferson manifested what would become the theoretical
underpinnings of an eventual move, almost a century later, toward direct democracy.
Said Jefferson: "I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the
people themselves, and, if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their
control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them but to
inform their discretion by education."' 14 Despite the fact that direct democracy can be
traced back as far as ancient Athens, not until the end of the nineteenth century did the
modem initiative begin to take root in America.
Journalist David S. Broder documents the social and economic upheaval during this
era that gave birth to populist politics:
At the same time that workers in many of the burgeoning urban areas found their
wages were being eroded by waves of cheap immigrant labor, farmers were caught
in a cycle of declining commodity prices and calamitous weather....
The political reaction to these twin economic forces took two forms: first, the
Populist movement, a farmer-worker protest challenging corporate power; and
later, the Progressive movement, a middle-class and intellectual movement bent on
cleaning up government corruption.15
Although the two movements were born of different forces, the one economic and the
other largely intellectual, they did share a common mistrust of government.
While most of the actual Populist platform was economic in nature, it also called for
the direct election of senators and "the legislative system known as the initiative and
referendum.' 16 Similarly, Progressive Party thinkers believed that institutional
mechanisms such as the initiative and referendum would replace bourgeoning
governmental corruption with a purer form of popular government. 17 Former

14. John F. Cooper, The Citizen InitiativePetitionto Amend State Constitutions:A Concept
Whose Time Has Passed,or a Vigorous Component ofParticipatoryDemocracy at the State
Level?, 28 N.M. L. REv. 227, 231 (1998).

15.

BRODER,

supranote 13, at 25-26. For a more complete history of both movements, see

E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE PoLmcs OF INTIlATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND
RECALL (1989).
16. BRODER, supra note 13, at 26.
17. Id.at 28. Broder quotes at length from historian Richard Hofstadter's 1955 book, The
Age of Reform:
What the majority of the Progressives hoped to do in the political field was to
restore popular government as they imagined it to have existed in an earlier and
purer age. This could be done, it was widely believed, only by revivifying the
morale of the citizen, and using his newly aroused zeal to push through a series of
changes in the mechanics of political life--direct primaries, popular election of
Senators, initiative, referendum, recall, the short ballot, commission government,
and the like. Such measures, it was expected, would deprive machine government
of the advantages it had in checkmating popular control, and make government
THOMAS

20061

TAKING THE INITIATIVE

Wisconsin governor Robert La Follette, a leading Progressive, lamented the degree to
which moneyed special interests had become entrenched in American society.18 "In
such a crisis," argued La Follette, "nothing but the united power of the people
expressed directly through the ballot can overthrow the enemy."' 19 One analyst has
described the debate over the initiative and referendum--the direct expression through
the ballot to which La Follette refers-as "the latest chapter" in the age-old debate over
the proper amount of political power that should be retained by the electorate.2 °
B. ContemporaryResort to DirectDemocracy
Beginning with South Dakota in 1898, nineteen states adopted the initiative during
the Progressive Era and its immediate aftermath. 21 At present, twenty-six state
constitutions "authorize voters to initiate legislation or to demand the referral of
legislative enactments." 22 Thirty-six states provide for one form or another of statutory
referenda, and only Delaware does not require amendments to the state constitution to
be approved by the electorate. 23 In addition, plebiscites-legislation passed through the
processes of direct democracy-have become an increasingly significant source of law
at the local level, 24 and the past decades have even witnessed a movement to enact a
nationwide initiative.25 Indeed, the sheer number of initiatives that invade the ballot
boxes in many
states each year leaves little doubt as to the present popularity of direct
26
democracy.
accessible to the superior disinterestedness and honesty of the average citizen.
Then, with the power of the bosses broken or crippled, it would be possible to
check the incursions of the interests upon the welfare of the people and realize a
cleaner, more efficient government.
Id. (quoting RIcHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955)).
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 27.
Id.
Cooper, supra note 14, at 231.
Collins & Oesterle, supra note 12, at 54. Between 1898 and 1918, four additional states

adopted some version of the popular referendum. See Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuitof "Popular
Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 113 (1995).
22. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review ofDirect Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1509 (1990);

see also Schacter, supra note 21, at 168 (listing the sources of authority for the twenty-one
states and the District of Columbia that permit the statutory initiative).
23. Eule, supra note 22, at 1509-10. For a discussion of the various forms of direct
democracy, see id. at 1510-13. See also Robin Charlow, JudicialReview,EqualProtectionand
the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 527, 531-33 (1994).
24. Charlow, supra note 23, at 528. While the annual number of statewide referenda in the
1970s and early 1980s seldom surpassed 400, the total number of referenda nationally,
including local measures, may have been as high as ten or fifteen thousand per year as early as
1970. Id. at 528 n.1.
25. Collins & Oesterle, supranote 12, at 54; see generally CRONIN, supranote 15, at 15795 (exploring the desirability of direct democracy at the national level).
26. Professor Eule of the University of California at Los Angeles documents his initial
shock at the degree to which direct democracy has taken a hold on California politics in
particular:
Sometime in mid-October a massive booklet arrived in my mailbox. At first I
thought it was the local phone directory. Closer examination revealed it to be a
"Ballot Pamphlet" from California's Secretary of State. Its contents included a
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Neither praise nor criticism of the political and sociological consequences of the
plebiscite system is difficult to discover,2 7 but thorough analyses of the legal intricacies
surrounding the initiative and referendum-and the constitutionality of the systemremain surprisingly rare.
II. THE COURTS' TREATMENT OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY:
PACIFIC STATES TELEPHONE& TELEGRAPH CO. V. OREGON

Article IV of the United States Constitution guarantees "to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government." 28 While the Constitution does not manifest any
specific form that satisfies the definition of republican government, James Madison
utilized The FederalistPapersto clearly distinguish between a "pure Democracy," in
which citizens jointly administer the state, and a "Republic" based on government by
representative. 29 According to Madison, democracy requires "a Society, consisting of a
small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the Government in person,"
whereas a republic implements a "scheme of representation." 30 Madison continued:
The two great points of difference between a Democracy and a Republic are, first,
the delegation of the Government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens
elected by the rest: secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of
country, over which the latter may be extended.3 '

staggering array of bond acts, proposed constitutional amendments and statutory
initiatives....
Just as I was struggling through the state ballot pamphlet and beginning to
wonder how I had graduated law school with a reading level below that of a thirdyear college student, the postal service delivered another ballot pamphlet. This one
was compiled by the Los Angeles City Clerk and contained text, summaries,
arguments-pro and con-and rebuttals for approximately half-a-dozen city ballot
measures. Although the pages were fewer-the 1988 version ran sixty-four
pages-and smaller... I was too dazed to exhibit the proper appreciation. By the
time a third pamphlet arrived, a gift from the County Registrar-Recorder with
information concerning the county measures, earthquakes were starting to look
appealing.
Eule, supra note 22, at 1508-09.
27. For a discussion of the degree to which the mechanisms of direct democracy have
satisfied its aims, see Collins & Oesterle, supra note 12, at 55-63, 126 (citing four concrete
aims of direct democrats--"empowerment of ordinary citizens; 'good government' aims such as
increased participation, involvement, and public discussion; majority rule as an ideal; and
countering [sic] governmental inefficiency"-and concluding that "the initiative can work as an
important check on representative and administrative government"). For a criticism of these
same devices, see Cooper, supranote 14, at 237-69.
28. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 43 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
30. Id.
31. Id. Again, in the The FederalistNo. 39, Madison defines a republic as "a government
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is
administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during
good behaviour." THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 29, at 190.
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To what extent, then, may the Constitution, which requires by its language a republican
form of government, be reconciled with the mechanisms of direct democracy?
The Supreme Court has spoken rarely and indirectly to this issue, but federal
jurisprudence regarding the so-called Guaranty Clause may be summarized by two
dicta: first, there can be little doubt that the Constitution mandates that each state
maintain a republican form of government; 32 and second, the Supreme Court
has
33
steadfastly refused to declare the precise dictates of this form of government.
The Court first had occasion to address the requirements of the Guaranty Clause in
34
the 1874 case of Minor v. Happersett.
In holding that individual states may
constitutionally deny women the right of suffrage without infringing on their status as
citizens, the Court pronounced that the Constitution designates no "particular
government" as republican in form. 35 The Constitution, according to the Happersett
Court, did not alter the state governments in existence at the time ofratification-these
governments "were accepted precisely as they were, and it is, therefore, to be presumed
that they were such as it was the duty of the States to provide." 36 These early
governments, however, made no allowance for a system of direct democracy
comparable to that instituted over a century later with the rise of the voter-initiated
ballot proposal.37
Soon after the infusion of the initiative into American politics, the Supreme Court
had occasion to address the constitutional permissibility of this particular instrument of
direct democracy. In 1902, Oregon amended its state constitution to give the people the
power to enact legislation directly, "independent of the legislative assembly."3 In a
pair of cases decided a decade later, the Court held that enforcement of the Guaranty
Clause belonged solely to the political department and therefore declared the
constitutionality of the initiative process to be non-justiciable. 39 In Pacific States

32. Hans A. Linde, Who is ResponsibleforRepublican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. REv.

709, 710 (1994). Justice Linde cites the 1874 Supreme Court case of Minor v. Happersettas
standing for this principle. Id. at 710 & n.3.
33. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). See also Linde, supranote
32, at 710-11.
34. 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
35. Id. at 175.
36. Id.at 175-76.

37. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text (citing South Dakota as the first state to
adopt the initiative, in 1898). In the early days of the Republic, many states did require the

adoption of a state constitution to be ratified by a vote of the electorate. BRODER, supra note 13,
at 23-24 (citing a referendum conducted in 1788 to adopt Massachusetts's new constitution and
one conducted in New York three decades later to adopt that state's revised constitution). As
referenda are initiated by the legislatures themselves, they are easily distinguished from citizen
initiatives.
38. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 223 U.S. at 133-34.
39. See id.; Kieman v. Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912). In Kiernan, it should be noted that
the state court did reach the merits of the federal question, finding the initiative process not in
conflict with Article IV of the Constitution. See Kieman v. Portland, 112 P. 402 (Or. 1910).
Said the Supreme Court of Oregon: "[I]n all states, whatever may be the restriction placed upon
their representatives, the people.., have had, and have, the power to directly legislate, and to
change all or any laws so far as deemed proper-limited only by clear inhibitions of the national
Constitution." Id.at 406. The court adopted an expansive definition of "republican form of
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Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, which has come to stand for the proposition
that questions arising under the Guaranty Clause will be deemed political in nature, the
Court was asked to invalidate a law passed through the initiative process that exacted a
tax on certain classes of corporations. 4° Relying heavily on its decision in Luther v.
Borden,41 a case decided more than half a century earlier, to support the conclusion
that questions arising under the Guaranty Clause are non-justiciable, the Court declared
the constitutionality of the initiative to be "a question for the determination of the
political department. ' 42 Precedent proved a severely limited tool in Pacific States
Telephone, however, for the Supreme Court had never previously been asked to
address the constitutionality of a government that was non-republican in form.
Chief Justice White's unanimous opinion in PacificStates Telephone justifies the
Court's decision-or, rather, the Court's refusal to reach a decision on the merits-by
recourse to the nature of the law at issue. Said the Chief Justice:
[The] essentially political nature [of the statute] is at once made manifest by
understanding that the assault which the contention here advanced makes it not on
the tax as a tax, but on the State as a State. It is addressed to the framework and
political character of the government by which the statute levying the tax was
passed. It is the government, the political entity, which.., is called to the bar of
this court, not for the purpose of testing judicially some exercise of power assailed,
on the ground that its exertion has injuriously affected the rights of an individual
because of repugnancy to some constitutional limitation, but to demand of the
State that it establish its right to exist as a State, republican in form.43
While to say that the law is political in nature may be little more than a play on words,
the non-justiciability of the initiative process has become well-settled law. Indeed, the
Guaranty Clause is the only constitutional clause that ' the
United States Supreme Court
4
has steadfastly held to be "judicially unenforceable.
Because of its uniform refusal to examine the merits of Guaranty Clause claims, the
Supreme Court has never held initiative procedures to be compatible with
representative government. 45 Rather, its dismissal for want of jurisdiction in Pacific
government," accepting any government in which supreme power lies with the people as
republican. See id. at 404-08. This overly broad definition was not explicitly accepted by the
Supreme Court.
40. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 223 U.S. at 135.
41. 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
42. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 223 U.S. at 149. As discussed in Pacific States Telephone,
the judicial officers in Luther were placed in the awkward position of deciding which of the two
opposing governments of Rhode Island was legitimate. Id.Because the issue was political in
nature, the Court refused to choose between two competing governments, both of which
governed by representation. See Luther, 48 U.S. at 3-6.
43. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 223 U.S. at 150-51.
44. In re Initiative Petition No. 348, State Question No. 640, 820 P.2d 772, 784 (Okla.
1991) (Opala, C.J., concurring in result) (citing J. Andrew Heaton, The GuaranteeClause:A
Rolefor the Courts, 16 CumB. L. REv. 477, 478 (1986)).

45. A handful of state courts have found initiative procedures to be both justiciable and
constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., Kiernan v. Portland, 112 P. 402 (Or. 1910); Iman v. S.
Pac. Co., 435 P.2d 851 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968). Prior to Pacific States Telephone, the Oregon
Supreme Court held the initiative and referendum procedures of the state's constitution to be in
accord with a republican form of government. Kadderly v. City of Portland, 74 P. 710, 719-20
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States Telephone indicates that a contrary decision by the state court would have

similarly been outside the purview of the Court.46 Unfortunately, state courts have
failed to seize upon a harmonized standard by which initiative procedures may be
examined.47
III. WHEN A LAW MAY NOT BE PASSED THROUGH DIRECT DEMOCRACY

Currently at issue is not the overall constitutionality of the initiative, for the
Supreme Court seems unwilling to even address this question. Rather, at issue for the
purposes of this Note is the debatable proposition that some laws may present unique
constitutional difficulties when passed through direct initiative.48 Justice Hans Linde of
the Supreme Court of Oregon has argued, for example, that initiative procedures
should not be deemed in keeping with Article IV of the Constitution when they fail to
satisfy "guaranteed standards of representative deliberation." 49 While Justice Linde has

(Or. 1903). Justice Bean wrote for the unanimous Kadderly Court:
[T]he initiative and referendum amendment does not abolish or destroy the
republican form of government, or substitute another in its place. The
representative character of the government still remains. The people have simply
reserved to themselves a larger share of legislative power, but they have not
overthrown the republican form of government ....
Id.at 720. For a brief criticism of the Kadderly decision, see Linde, supra note 32, at 715-16
(arguing that Justice Bean's legal defense of initiatives is logically flawed).
46. See Linde, supra note 32, at 714. Justice Linde acknowledges several state court cases,
decided in the aftermath of PacificStates Telephone, that he believes misinterpreted the Court's
decision. Id.at 714 & n.21 (citing three state court decisions-in Colorado, South Dakota, and
Arizona-in which the court refused to invalidate initiative processes because of the Supreme
Court's holding in PacificStates Telephone). In the last of these decisions, Iman v. Southern
Pacific Company, the Arizona Court of Appeals, after holding that republican government is a
question solely for the legislature, nonetheless reached the merits and sustained the initiative as
consistent with the Guaranty Clause. Iman, 435 P.2d at 854-55.
47. In a 1980 Colorado case, for example, the court had no trouble declaring the
justiciability of the processes of direct democracy: it held the power of initiative to be "a
fundamental right at the very core of our republican form of government." McKee v. City of
Louisville, 616 P.2d 969, 972 (Colo. 1980) (comparing the power of initiative to the
fundamental right to vote). This decision exists in stark contrast to those decisions that have
found such questions to be for the political department alone under Pacific States Telephone.
See Linde, supra note 32, at 714 & n.21.
48. Although the term "referendum" will occasionally appear throughout this Note, it is
helpful-for the purposes of legal analysis-to distinguish between the two primary
mechanisms of direct democracy. The crux of this Note's argument focuses on the questionable
legality of the initiative, not the referendum: as the referendum is a case-specific delegation of
legislative power by the legislature,the constitutional questions it poses differ dramatically from
those posed by the citizen initiative.
49. Linde, supra note 32, at 724. Among those initiatives that should be disqualified,
according to Justice Linde, are those that stigmatize a social group, those that are directed
against an identifiable social group, those that are proposed in a context that leaves no doubt
that the initiative asks voters to choose for or against such a group, and those that make
emotional appeals to impose majoritarian values that offend other groups in the community. Id.
at n.56; see also Hans A. Linde, When Is Initiative Lawmaking Not "Republican
Government"?, 17 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 159 (1989).
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focused his attack on the propensity of initiatives to lead to overly majoritarian
results, 50 the debate between majority rule and minority rights rarely transcends

political theory. It is the contention of this Note that, even if government by direct
initiative is deemed "representative" within the meaning of the United States
Constitution, special problems arise when the subject matter of these proposed laws
either adversely affects minority groups or is presented to the electorate in an
unnecessarily complex fashion. In either case, the result of the initiative process will
likely fail to satisfy Justice Linde's "standards of representative deliberation."
A. Initiatives and Majoritarianism
Majoritarian democracy, despite its potential shortcomings, is at the very core of
our constitutional system. 51 James Madison wrote in favor of the nascent Constitution
in The FederalistNo. 39: "It is essentialto such a [republican] government, that it be
derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a
favored class of it."'5 2 This notion was echoed half a century later by Alexis de

Tocqueville, who wrote that "[i]n the United States the majority governs in the name of
the people, as is the case in all countries in which the people are supreme." 53 To some
extent, the emergence of the direct initiative may be considered the modem pinnacle of
majoritarianism, for the majority not only controls who legislates but also decides
which legislation is enacted. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has been willing to
invalidate legislation passed through direct democracy-whether or not it reflects the
will of the majority-when such legislation inappropriately infringes on the rights of a
minority group. 4
In Hunter v. Erickson, for example, the Court hesitated only briefly before striking
down a section of a city charter that prevented the city council from enacting any
ordinance concerning racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in housing without
the approval of a majority of the city's voters.55 The effect of the law, which was

50. See Hans A. Linde, When InitiativeLawmaking Is Not "RepublicanGovernment": The

CampaignAgainst Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19 (1993); Linde, supra note 49.
51. Eule, supra note 22, at 1513.
52. THE FEDERALISTNO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 29, at 190 (emphasis in original).
53. 1 DETOCQuEVILLE, supra note 2, at 173.

54. It should be noted at this point that several commentators have suggested that even
direct democracy does not accurately reflect the will of the majority. See generally BRODER,
supra note 13 (arguing that the amount of capital necessary to run a successful initiative
campaign has become so large that powerful elites have come to overwhelmingly control even
the mechanisms of direct democracy); Charlow, supranote 23, at 602-09 (contending that both
the representative system and the system of direct democracy allow for a phenomenon that the
author refers to as the "less-than-majority-backed laws"); Eule, supra note 22, at 1513-30
(suggesting that "popular votes do a flawed job of discovering what 'the people' really want" for
reasons such as low levels of voter participation). Obviously, the notion that initiatives may not
always represent majority will undercuts much of Justice Scalia's argument.
55. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). Section 137 of the City Charter of Akron,
Ohio provided in part that
[a]ny ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which regulates the
use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or financing
of real property of any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of race, color,
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56
placed on the ballot at a general election and passed by a majority of the electorate,
was to substantially disadvantage those who would benefit from laws barring certain
types of discrimination. 57 Explained Justice White: "[F]or those who sought protection
against racial bias, the approval of the City Council was not enough. A referendum was
required by charter at a general or regular election ... ."58 Despite the fact that the law
was neutral on its face, the city charter actually made the enactment of ordinances
protecting minority groups significantly more difficult to secure.5 9 Consequently, the
reservation of power to the people was deemed, in this case, unconstitutional.6 °
Notwithstanding a majority vote of the citizens of Akron, Ohio, the Court invalidated a
law-passed through direct democracy and requiring the submission of certain matters
to the same mechanisms of direct democracy-with an adverse effect on certain
minority groups.
In more recent years, the effect of the initiative on minority groups has become most
prevalent in voters' attempts to alter the legal status of homosexuals. Relying partially
on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hunter, the Supreme Court of Colorado
declared a 1992 amendment to the state constitution-passed via initiative-to be
violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Favored by over fifty-three percent of the
state's voters, Amendment 2 prohibited the state legislature from enacting any
legislation that would entitle homosexuals to protected legal status or to claims of
discrimination. 61 The court, in invalidating the amendment, upheld the trial court's
determination that the Fourteenth Amendment protects "the fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process" and that any legislation "which infringes on
this right by 'fencing out' an independently identifiable class of persons" must be
presumed unconstitutional. 62Commentators have suggested two possible explanations
for the state court's decision: the court found relevant either the fact that Amendment 2
was a constitutional provision or the fact that the amendment was popularly enacted.63

religion, national origin or ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the
electors voting on the question at a regular or general election before said
ordinance shall be effective.
Id. at 387.
56. Id. at 387.
57. Id at 387, 390-91.
58. Id. at 390.
59. Id. at 390-91 ("[A]lthough the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile
in an identical manner, the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority. The majority
needs no protection against discrimination and if it did, a referendum might be bothersome but
no more than that.").
60. Incredulous at the Court's decision, Justice Black wrote in dissent: "In this
Government, which we boast is 'of the people, by the people, and for the people,' conditioning
the enactment of a law on a majority vote of the people condemns that law as unconstitutional in
the eyes of the Court!" Id. at 397 (Black, J., dissenting).
61. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Colo. 1994), aff'don other grounds, 517 U.S.
620 (1996).
62. Id. at 1339 (quoting from the court's decision in Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282
(Colo. 1993)).
63. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RIcHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1007 (2d ed. 2002). Professor
Issacharoff and his colleagues declare it "implausible" that the Colorado Supreme Court would
have reached the same decision if the legislature "had simply pre-empted all local anti-
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A majority of the United States Supreme Court did not explicitly address the socalled "political process" argument on which the state court relied; it instead utilized
traditional equal protection analysis to uphold the lower court's decision. 64 In pursuing
this analysis, however, the Court found problematic any "law declaring that in general
it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from
the government." 65 While this statement involves no reference to the mechanisms of
direct democracy that caused Amendment 2 to be enacted, it nonetheless serves to
manifest the notion that the protection
of minority groups is well within the purview of
66
both the courts and the government.
Over the past half century, the Court has continued to treat with significant distrust
laws enacted through the mechanisms of direct democracy that establish barriers to
minority demands or that restrict minority rights.67 While no decision goes so far as to

discrimination ordinances." Id.
64. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
65. Id. at 633.
66. Justice Scalia's vigorous dissent, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
joined, resorted-much like the state court-to an analysis of the relative political power of
homosexuals. See id.at 636-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Rather than finding the minority status
of homosexuals to be determinative, however, Justice Scalia found relevant the disproportionate
level of political power enjoyed by this particular minority group. Id. at 636, 645-46 (referring
to homosexuals as a "politically powerful minority"). Argued Justice Scalia:
[B]ecause those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in
disproportionate numbers in certain communities, have high disposable income,
and, of course, care about homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the
public at large, they possess political power much greater than their numbers, both
locally and statewide. Quite understandably, they devote this political power to
achieving not merely a grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of
homosexuality.
Id. at 645-46 (citations omitted). Unlike the state court, for whom a lack of political power led
to the presumptive invalidity of the legislation, Justice Scalia's dissent implicitly found the
majoritarian nature of the initiative process necessary in order to curb the surplus of political
power experienced by a minority group.
67. In addition to HunterandRomer, see Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S.
457, 474-75 (1982) (striking down an initiative that prohibited school boards from requiring
any student to attend a school other than the one nearest or next nearest his or her home, thus
removing "the authority to address a racial problem... from the existing decisionmaking body,
in such a way as to burden minority interests"); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding
a West Virginia supermajority statute requiring that political subdivisions of the state not incur
bonded indebtedness or increase tax rates without the approval of sixty percent of the voters);
Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964) (holding that the
implementation of a change in legislative structure through popular referendum does not
immunize that change from Fourteenth Amendment review). In Gordon, the Supreme Court
observed that the law does not require states to govern by majority rule: "Certainly any
departure from strict majority rule gives disproportionate power to the minority. But there is
nothing in the language of the Constitution, our history, or our cases that requires that a majority
always prevail on every issue." Gordon, 403 U.S. at 6. For similar state court decisions, with an
emphasis on the State of Oregon, see Linde, supra note 50, at 20 & nn.3-5.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of a statute
passed via direct democracy that burdened the political influence of a majority of California's
electorate. In Coalitionfor Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), the court
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say that an otherwise constitutional law has been rendered unconstitutional by the
overtly democratic manner in which it was passed, the implication is nonetheless
present: there exists a need, long existent both in American politics and in American
jurisprudence, to protect minority groups from the so-called "tyranny of the majority."
Legislation that is passed through the traditional mechanisms of representative
government-state legislatures-tends toward the institutional protection of minority
groups, for, as Justice Scalia observed in his Romer dissent, the political power of
these groups is frequently far greater than their numbers.
B. The Competence of the Electorate:
Complexity ofLegislation, Conflict of Initiatives, and Interpretive Dilemmas
In his Pulitzer Prize-winning study of the American Revolution and its aftermath,
historian Gordon Wood notes that the Founders "sought to construct a society and
governments based on virtue and disinterested public leadership and to set in motion a
moral movement that would eventually be felt around the globe. 't However, the
realities of individual self-interest immediately began to hinder this communal morale.
Laments Professor Wood:
[T]he ink on the Declaration of Independence was scarcely dry before many of the
revolutionary leaders began expressing doubts about the possibility of realizing
these high hopes. The American people seemed incapable of the degree of virtue
needed for republicanism. Too many were unwilling to respect the authority of
their new elected leaders and were too deeply involved in trade and moneymaking
to think beyond their narrow interests or their neighborhoods
and to concern
69
themselves with the welfare of their states or their country.
Not only could the electorate at the time of the founding not be trusted with a
democracy, but it could scarcely be trusted with a republic. In addition to the problems
inherent in the majoritarian nature of plebiscites, the question exists whether the
citizenry is competent to make legislative decisions on a grand scale.

upheld as constitutional Proposition 209, an affirmative action initiative that prohibited the state
or its political subdivisions from granting preferential treatment to any individual or group on
the basis of "race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin." Id. at 696. Proposition 209,
according to the plaintiffs, placed procedural burdens "in the path of women and minorities,
who together constitute a majority of the California electorate." Id. at 704. For this reason,
Wilson was easily distinguishable from precedent cases that invalidated statutes and
constitutional amendments designed to hinder the political power of a minority. Relying on the
Supreme Court's statement in Hunter that "[t]he majority needs no protection against
discrimination," the Wilson court declared that "[i]t would seem to make little sense to apply
'political structure' equal protection principles where the group alleged to face special political
burdens itself constitutes a majority of the electorate." Id.
68. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTnON 229 (1991).
69. Id. Wood goes on to observe that "a new breed of popular leader"-one "who was far
less educated, less liberal, and less cosmopolitan" than most revolutionaries had expectedbegan emerging in the nascent state legislatures. Id. "These new popular leaders were exploiting
the revolutionary rhetoric of liberty and equality to vault into political power and to promote the
partial and local interests of their constituents at the expense of what the revolutionary gentry
saw as the public good." Id.
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It should seem manifest that constraints on voters' time and energy will frequently
prevent a thorough understanding of the intricacies of proposed legislation. The longterm health of the locality will more often bow to immediate desires in a system of
direct democracy than in a republican model. And the dramatic influx of initiative
campaigning has increased the likelihood that interested parties will seek to deceive or
confuse voters by bombarding them with advertisements that either over-simplify or
otherwise distort an issue. 70
1. Single-Subject Rules
In order to control the complications arising from the processes of direct
democracy, states have occasionally relied on so-called "single-subject rules" for
initiatives, intended to limit the scope of legislation established by the citizenry.71 As
an example, California's state constitution was amended in 1948 to limit proposed
initiatives to a single subject.72 Despite the apparent simplicity of the rule, however, the
courts were left with the somewhat daunting task of determining its precise contours.

70. Professors Richard Collins and Dale Oesterle of the University of Colorado present
three grounds on which long and-complex initiatives may be criticized. See Collins &Oesterle,
supra note 12, at 84-86. First, constitutional stability may be undermined by initiatives that
"alter state government too much" because these initiatives may "entrench a measure beyond the
reach of the legislature." Id. at 84-85. Second, highly complex initiatives will increase the level
of voter confusion and the level of voter irritation. Id. at 85 ("When a [sic] initiative is long and
complicated.., it exacerbates the problem of informing voters. The tendency to compress the
debates over initiative issues into thirty second television spots means that the debate over
multi-issue initiatives will focus on one or two issues .... Voters will simply not know about,
much less understand in any depth, many of the sub-issues."). And third, when a proposed
initiative contains multiple issues, voters are prohibited from passing legislation on one issue
without also passing judgment on other issues. Id. at 85-86. Thus, legislation may be passed
through direct democracy even when certain issues contained within that legislation would be
unable to gamer a majority vote if they stood alone.
71. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d) ("An initiative measure embracing more than one
subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.").
72. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, CaliforniaInitiativesand the Single-SubjectRule, 30 UCLA
L. REv. 936, 936 (1983). The original language of this amendment read:
Every constitutional amendment or statute proposed by the initiative shall relate to
but one subject. No such amendment or statute shall hereafter be submitted to the
electors if it embraces more than one subject, nor shall any such amendment or
statute embracing more than one subject, hereafter submitted to or approved by the
electors, become effective for any purpose.
Id. at 953 n.69. In 1966, the rule was reworded in its present form. Id. For the present language,
see supra note 71.
Professor Lowenstein has proposed two major purposes for this: the simplification and
clarification of initiatives in order to avoid voter confusion, and the prevention of "logrolling"
that could subvert the will of the majority. Id. at 954-65. While Lowenstein does not suggest
that initiatives containing multiple issues could become constitutionally problematic even
without California's single-subject rule, he does acknowledge the role that these purposes play,
often implicitly, in state court decisions determining the precise contours of the rule. See id. at
942-44, 951-53. Lowenstein's proposals echo the criticisms of Professors Collins and Oesterle.
See supra note 70.
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In the months following the passage of California's single-subject rule, the necessity
of establishing the legal extent of a "single subject" became apparent.73 The plaintiffs
in Perry v. Jordan claimed that an initiative put before the electorate in the 1948
general election which would repeal Article XXV of the state constitution violated the
newly enacted rule. 74 Comparing the single-subject rule for initiatives to a similar rule
applicable to acts of the legislature, the Perry court adopted an exceedingly broad
interpretation of this rule. Said the court: "the [single-subject] provision is not to
receive a narrow or technical construction in all cases, but is to be construed liberally
to uphold proper legislation, all parts of which are reasonably germane."75 Despite the
fact that opponents of the initiative referenced eighteen incidental purposes of' the
76
repeal measure, the court determined these to be mere "administive [sic] details.

Unlike the average voter, legislators typically possess the time, resources, and
expertise to determine the implications and consequences ofproposed legislation: any
court decision equating the position of ordinary citizens to that of legislators certainly
fails to account for numerous differences on which our republican system of
governance is based. The problems of direct democracy are exacerbated by overly
legislative power to make
complex initiatives, which jettison not only the traditional
77
law but also the legislative competence to understandit.

Further, the breadth of the "reasonably germane" standard articulated by the Perry
court creates such a flexible test that it does not necessarily require the separate
78
provisions of an initiative "to be related to each other in any particular manner.,
While the single-subject rule likely does not extend as far as Professor Daniel
Lowenstein's initial suggestion that "[t]he mere fact that the provisions [of an

73. See Perry v. Jordan, 207 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1949).
74. Id. at 48-49. Article XXV of the California State Constitution provided for certain
"pensions for the needy aged and blind .... Id. at 48.
75. Id. at 50 (quoting Evans v. Superior Court, 8 P.2d 467, 469 (Cal. 1932) (pertaining to
the scope and application of the article of the state constitution prohibiting acts of the legislature
from embracing more than one subject)).
76. Id. Of the two purposes of single-subject rules proposed by Professor Lowenstein, see
supra note 72, only the latter seems to be entirely in keeping with the Perrydecision. Professor
Lowenstein's suggestion that single-subject rules serve to simplify ballot initiatives in order to
avoid voter confusion is somewhat undercut both by the manner in which the Perry court
analogizes the initiative process to the typical legislative process and by the broad standard
developed by the court.
77. Professors Collins and Oesterle advocate several reforms to Colorado's processes of
direct democracy. Among these: require a majority vote from a minimum portion of the
electorate in order to enact a constitutional amendment; limit constitutional amendments to a
single subject, but "be less strict about the scope of statutory initiatives"; impose a word limit on
both constitutional amendments and statutes passed through the initiative process; and require
the final text of constitutional initiatives to be drafted by the state's attorney general, legislative
counsel, or other official. Collins and Oesterle, supra note 12, at 108-09. Collins and Oesterle
also recommend the use of the indirect initiative, through which citizens first petition the
legislature itself for constitutional or statutory change and only if rebuffed may they force a
popular vote. Id. at 107. Obviously, any increased involvement of the legislature in the
legislative process reduces the likelihood that the process infringes upon a proper separation of
powers.
78. Lowenstein, supranote 72, at 943-44.
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initiative] have been put together in one measure makes them constitute a 'single
subject, ,' 79only the most blatantly diverse initiatives would likely be struck down
under the Perry standard. 80 Indeed, no justice adhering to the "reasonably germane"
standard has ever voted to invalidate an initiative on the grounds that it violates
California's single-subject rule.8
As a matter of policy, multi-subject initiatives frequently serve to further complicate
an already complicated process. As a matter of practicality, they may be seen as a brief
retreat from the system of majoritarian rule that is thought to be at the very heart of
direct democracy. But as a matter of constitutionality, no court has ever deemed
complex initiatives to be more or less suspect than any other democratic enactment
instigated by the same processes. Nonetheless, the expertise of the electorate certainly
does not extend so far as advocates of an unlimited power of initiative would suggest.
By permitting the scope of an initiative to go unrestricted, states effectively circumvent
not only the dictates of representative government but also the very purposes that this
form of government was intended to serve.
2. Competing Initiatives
The inexperience-or, to use the term that comes most naturally, incompetence--of
voters attempting to legislate at the polls is frequently manifested by the outcomes of
initiative elections. In recent elections, the explosion in the number of initiated statutes
and constitutional amendments presented to the electorate can partially be explained by

79. Id.at 942.
80. Id. at 944.
81. Id. For an example of a bill that was invalidated on single-subject grounds, see In re
House Bill No. 1353, 738 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1987) (per curiam). In that case, decided under
Colorado's single-subject rule for legislative enactments, the Supreme Court of Colorado
declared the invalidity of a bill that was forty-four pages long and contained forty-six sections.
Id.
at 372. Although the various sections were united by a desire to increase state revenues, they
covered
such disparate subjects as reduction of state contributions to various state
employees' retirement funds, creation of a commission on information
management in the department of administration, imposition of a charge against
accounts of inmates of the department of corrections for each medical visit,
imposition or increase of fees to be charged by various state agencies, addition of a
surcharge to be imposed on insurance carriers based upon worker's compensation
insurance premiums received, transfer of certain state severance tax moneys to the
general fund, extension of the termination date of the joint review process with
respect to permits and licenses relating to the development of natural resources,
direction to the state personnel director to use salary and fringe benefit surveys
conducted by nonstate agencies to determine comparable rates concerning
employees in the state personnel system, revision of the statutory formula for
medicaid reimbursements to nursing homes, provision for forfeiture of abandoned
intangible property held by banking and financial organizations and for crediting
the proceeds to the state, and elimination of state aid for instructional television.
Id. at 372-73. But cf Parrish v. Lamm, 758 P.2d 1356 (Colo. 1988) (upholding a health care
bill that pertained both to certain health insurance abuses committed by health care providers
and to the advertisement of these practices).
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an increasing resort to alternative or competing initiatives-multiple initiatives on the
same ballot that address the same issue and are often in direct conflict with one
another.8 2 While these conflicting initiatives may appear as though they simply increase
voter choice, in actuality they amplify voter confusion, offer unique opportunities for
moneyed interests to deceive voters, and present difficult interpretive dilemmas for
judicial officers.
Of the seventeen measures presented to the voters of California in the 1990 general
election, at least eight were so-called alternative initiatives.8 3 That state's 1988 general
election ballot contained four competing initiatives that would reform automobile
insurance rates to different degrees.84 The 1992 general election ballot in Colorado
contained four different constitutional amendments "address[ing] gambling in different
areas in the state. 8 5 But the occasionally perverse results of conflicting initiatives
reached a crescendo in the aftermath of the California primary election in June of 1988.
In Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices
Commission,8 6 the Supreme Court of California addressed two competing initiatives
concerning campaign finance reform, both of which were passed by the electorate.
Under California state law, when a conflict between two measures passed at the same
election occurs, the conflicting provisions "of the measure receiving the highest

82. K.K. DuVivier, By Going Wrong All Things Come Right: UsingAlternateInitiatives to
Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. CN. L. REv. 1185, 1186 (1995).
83. See id. at 1189-91 & n.48. In the most startling example of initiative warfare,
environmentalists first introduced "Big Green," a comprehensive measure that would "curtail
the felling of ancient forests, halt the spraying of dangerous pesticides and restrict offshore oil
drilling." Id. at 1190 (quoting Jorge Casuso, CaliforniaGets Dizzy from InitiativeFever, Cmu.
TRm., Sept. 30, 1990, at Cl). Because this measure was not radical enough for some "antilogging militants," Proposition 130 was introduced as an even more stringent restriction on
deforestation. Id. at 1190 & n.36. Fearing that simply mounting an opposition to the
environmentalist measures would be insufficient, the timber industry countered with Proposition
138, "a more moderate regulation of timber harvesting." Id. at 1190. In response to Big Green's
restrictions on pesticide use, farm groups and chemical manufacturers successfully introduced
Proposition 135, which would control pesticide use but require less stringent regulations than its
alternative. Id. (noting that in the 1986 election cycle these same groups had simply opposed a
pesticide initiative but "were clobbered").
On the same ballot, several California groups introduced a statute that would impose an
additional tax on alcoholic beverages. Id. (referencing Proposition 134). The alcohol industry
then helped fund Proposition 136, a measure that Justice Mosk of the Supreme Court of
California would refer to as a "Trojan horse." See Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v.
Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220, 1246 n. 1 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). According to Professor DuVivier, Proposition 136 operated
"[u]nder the guise of a taxpayer's right to vote on new taxes," but the measure contained a
provision that could have completely invalidated Big Green, Proposition 134, and two crime
control measures. DuVivier, supra note 82, at 1191.
Interestingly, not one of the measures addressing the environment or taxation passed in the
1990 election cycle. Id. The ballot also contained two initiatives concerning term limits for
elected officials. Id. at 1191 n.48 (referencing Proposition 140 and Proposition 131).
Proposition 140 did pass. Id.

84. Id. at 1191.
85. Id. at 1191-92.
86. 799 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1990).
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affirmative vote shall prevail. 's The court first held the two propositions to be in
irreconcilable conflict.8 8 Then, in consonance with the state constitution, the court
decreed that only the conflicting provisions of Proposition 73, which was passed by a
greater margin than its alternative, would be deemed operative. 89 However, in the
months preceding the state court's decision in Taxpayers to Limit CampaignSpending,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California invalidated
Proposition 73 as violative of political candidates' First Amendment rights. 90 Thus,
despite the passage by the electorate of two separate-albeit conflicting-propositions
pertaining to campaign finance reform, the legal intricacies surrounding alternative
initiatives had the ironic, and blatantly anti-majoritarian, effect of leading to the
invalidation of both measures.
3. Judicial Interpretation of Initiative Legislation
Multiple commentators have asserted that statutes and constitutional amendments
passed through the advent of direct democracy pose interpretive dilemmas that are
simply not present in traditional legislative enactments. 91 While these potential
problems with the interpretation of so-called plebiscites-problems based largely on
the inability of courts to properly determine "popular intent"-are no doubt interesting,
they deserve only brief mention as their relevance to this Note is strictly academic.
IV. THE RIGHTS OF POLITICAL PARTIES
The broad legal and pragmatic difficulties of direct democracy notwithstanding, this
Note confines itself to the following assertion: with the Supreme Court having
established the non-justiciability of most claims under the Guaranty Clause, there is
something unique about a state's decision to alter the structure of its primary elections
that renders the initiative system especially problematic. 92 To no small extent, the
distinctiveness of this assertion is contingent upon the fact that primary elections have
traditionally been considered a party affair. As such, the constitutionally guaranteed

87. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(b). Eleven of the initiative states maintain constitutionally
enacted procedures for resolving conflicts if competing measures are passed at the same
election. See DuVivier, supra note 82, at 1212 n.184. Three additional states maintain similar
statutory procedures. See id.
88. Taxpayers to Limit CampaignSpending,799 P.2d at 1226. The court explained: "Both
the differences [in the details of the measures], and the manner in which the two propositions
were drafted and presented to the voters, clearly indicated that they were offered as alternative
regulatory schemes." Id. As further evidence, the court cited the manner in which both measures
would add different provisions to the same chapter and title of the state code and the manner in
which the ballot arguments alerted voters to the presence of the two propositions as alternatives.
Id,
89. Id. at 1236-37. With 99% of the precincts reporting, 58% of the electorate approved
Proposition 73; only 53% approved its alternative, Proposition 68. Id. at 1230 n.7.
90. See Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 747 F. Supp. 580
(E.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 955 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1992).
91. See, e.g., Charlow, supra note 23; Eule, supra note 22; Schacter, supra note 21.
92. See also infra Part V.
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rights of political parties are critical to any analysis of the manner in which primary
elections are held.
A. Background on Political Parties
A thorough examination of the United States Constitution will manifest no provision
either requiring or explicitly permitting the formation of political parties. Indeed, prior
to the establishment of a national government, James Madison raged against the
"dangerous vice" of factionalism. 93 Madison believed that factions-which he defined
as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole,
who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion... adverse to the
rights of other citizens," a definition that would most certainly include political
parties-introduced "instability, injustice and confusion" into democratic
governance. 94 This desire to prevent factionalism from taking root in American
society
95
was echoed a decade later by President Washington in his farewell address.
Nonetheless, it was during the debates over the enactment of the fledgling
Constitution that a primitive party structure could first be observed in American
politics: those who framed the debate were conveniently labeled "Federalists" and
"Anti-Federalists," with their opinion of the Constitution itself being the determinative
factor. 96 After George Washington's presidency, deep divisions in the American
conscience-over issues as diverse as foreign relations and the formation of a national
97
bank-served as the building blocks for the institutionalization of a party system.
This growth in the power of political parties, however, was limited almost entirely
to the actual party leadership; candidates for public office were chosen not by the
citizenry (or even the party rank-and-file) through primary elections, but by party
leaders through caucuses and conventions.98 During the Progressive Movement at the
end of the nineteenth century, the same populist rhetoric that led to the radical
invention of direct democracy also led to the popularization of partisan primary

93. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 29, at 43.
94. Id. at 107 (referring to these vices as "the mortal diseases under which popular
governments have everywhere perished").
95. Sean M. Ramaley, Comment, Is the Bell Tolling: Will theDeath ofthe PartisanBlanket
PrimarySignal the End for Open PrimaryElections?, 63 U. Prrr. L. REv. 217, 220 & n.24

(2001). In his farewell address, President Washington argued that "[t]he alternate domination of
one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissention, which in
different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful
despotism." Id. at 220 n.24.
96. Id. at 220.
97. See THE MAKING
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1789 To 1809, at 28 (Noble E.

Cunningham, Jr. ed., 1965). One commentator has suggested that the presidential election of
1824, in which John Quincy Adams was elected by the House of Representatives after no
candidate successfully garnered a majority of electoral votes, bolstered the strength of national
parties because the controversial nature of the election led to a "four-year, grass-roots
campaign" by Andrew Jackson and his populist followers. See Ramaley, supranote 95, at 221
& n.29 (quoting from ALICE
PERFORMANCE 11 (1975)).

98. Seeid. at 221-22.
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elections.9 In 1904, Wisconsin became the first state to adopt a mandatory primary
of the next twelve years most states implemented similar
election, and over the course
00
mechanisms.
electoral
While the right of states to enact legislation requiring partisan primaries has never
been seriously questioned, the courts have consistently invalidated legislation deemed
violative of other constitutionally guaranteed rights of political parties. Most
importantly, the courts-frequently in the guise of the U.S. Supreme Court-have
recognized, to one extent or another, an extensive right of free association enjoyed by
parties. ' ° 1
B. PoliticalParties' Right of FreeAssociation
Before California Democratic Party v. Jones
In recent decades, a theory of the First Amendment concerned primarily "with
identifying and protecting private expression against governmental regulatory
0 2
Thus, any First
excesses" has become entrenched in American jurisprudence.
balancing test: a
rudimentary
a
relatively
utilizes
activity
party
into
Amendment inquiry
is balanced
expression
and
association
of
rights
private
upon
regulation's infringement
03
In that
rights.'
these
affecting
regulation
against the necessity of the governmental
a
"only
held
that
and
dogmatically
consistently
vein, the Supreme Court has
constitutional
the
State's
within
subject
of
a
the
regulation
in
compelling state interest
4
power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms."''
While the First Amendment does protect the right of citizens to associate and form
10 5
states may
political parties for the advancement of common political ideals,

99. See id.
100. Id. Most, but not all, of the systems of primary elections developed by states were also
mandatory. See id.
101. See Lucas Carscadden, Trevor Creel, Brendhan Flynn, Liane Groth, Richie Kosmala,
Karen Levy, Jason Morris & Gavin Rose, The American Electoral System: Governability and
Representativeness 5-8 (Fall 2004) (unpublished essay, Indiana University) (on file with
author). Carscadden and his co-authors focus on the right of political parties to control internal
party affairs, noting implicitly that this right is contingent upon parties' associational freedom
and arguing that "[p]arties, like individuals, possess First Amendment rights of association that
are implicated when an outsider to the party attempts to dictate who may participate in party
activities." Id. at 6.
102. Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a "Public Rights" First
Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 1951 (2003). Professor Magarian describes this
new approach to the First Amendment as the "private rights theory," as opposed to the "public
rights theory," which emphasizes the rights of the public to receive and disseminate information.
See id. at 1972-73 ("[The First Amendment] was written to clear the way for thinking which
serves the general welfare."); see also Lauren Hancock, Note, The Life of the Party:Analyzing
PoliticalParties'FirstAmendment AssociationalRights when the PrimaryElection Processis
ConstruedAlong a Continuum, 88 MINN. L. REV. 159, 169 & n.67 (2003).
103. Hancock, supra note 102, at 169.
104. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415,438 (1963).
105. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604,615-16 (1996) ("A
political party's independent expression not only reflects its members' views about the
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nonetheless enact reasonable regulations of parties, elections, and ballots-largely for
the purpose of reducing election and campaign-related disorder.'° Thus, in Burdick v.
Takushi, Hawaii's ban on write-in voting was upheld as a reasonable, politically
neutral regulation. 10 7 While it imposed a slight burden on the right to vote, this burden
was justified by Hawaii's interest in "avoid[ing] the possibility of unrestrained
factionalism at the general electionwe"'10 8 and preventing "party raiding"--a process by
which blocs of voters switch from one party to another in order to manipulate the other
party's primary election.'°9
Similarly, in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,"10 in which the Court upheld
Minnesota's ban on fusion tickets,"' Chief Justice Rehnquist expounded a series of
state interests capable ofjustifying a governmental infringement on the associational
rights of its parties: the protection of "the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of...
ballots and election processes"; the desire to prevent minor parties from capitalizing
"on the popularity of another party's candidate"; and the maintenance of a stable
political system that "may, in practice, favor the traditional two-party system." 112 From
both a political and a legal standpoint, this last justification is especially noteworthy
because of the Court's explicit acknowledgment of the state's limited right to prohibit
certain minority voices-those of third 3parties and their members-from receiving an
equal voice in American governance."l
More than a decade before Timmons was decided, the Court spoke directly to the
party's right to determine who may vote in a primary election. In 1984, the Republican
philosophical and governmental matters that bind them together, it also seeks to convince others
to join those members in a practical democratic task, the task of creating a government that
voters can instruct and hold responsible for subsequent success or failure."). Justice Breyer's
opinion of the Court goes on to say that "[t]he independent expression of a political party's
views is 'core' First Amendment activity no less than is the independent expression of
individuals, candidates, or other political committees." Id. at 616 (citing as an example Eu v.
S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989)); see also Democratic Party v.
Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981) (holding that "the inclusion of persons
unaffiliated with a political party may seriously distort its collective decisions" and, therefore,
that a party may freely elect to exclude those who refuse to associate with the party); Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975) (explicating that political parties and their adherents "enjoy a
constitutionally protected right of political association").
106. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) ("Common sense, as well as
constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must play an active role in
structuring elections .... "). Justice White quotes a 1974 decision of the Court: "'[A]s a
practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.'
Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
107. Id. at441-42.
108. Id. at 439 (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196 (1986))
(alteration in original).
109. Id.
110. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
111. Minnesota's anti-fusion statutes prohibited a candidate from appearing on the ballot as

the candidate for more than one party. Hancock, supra note 101, at 170 & n.72.
112. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 364-67.
113. See Carscadden, et al., supra note 100, at 8 ("[M]uch leeway is given to political
parties, especially the two major parties,as groups themselves worthy of representation on a
grander scale.") (emphasis added).
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Party of Connecticut adopted a rule that allowed independent voters to vote in
Republican primary elections for state and federal office.1 4 Permitting the inclusion of
independent voters in the partisan primary, it was believed, would "broaden the base of
public participation in and support for its activities," likely leading to the nomination
of candidates capable of proving victorious at the general election.'l5 However, this
party rule was in direct violation of a provision of Connecticut's election code that
required voters in a partisan primary to be registered members of that party." 6 After
weighing the associational rights of the party against the state's interest in regulating
elections, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's conclusion that "[a]ny effort by
the state to substitute its judgment for that of the party on... the question of who is
and is not sufficiently allied in interest with the party to warrant inclusion in its
candidate selection process... substantially impinges on First Amendment rights."' '
Appearing to apply strict scrutiny in its analysis of the Connecticut statute, the Court
found itself unable to identify any compelling state interest that would justify the
in a party's primary election be registered members of
requirement that all participants
8
that political party."
In retreating from the overtly political nature of the case, Justice Marshall noted that
it was not the role of the judicial department to determine whether the state legislature
acted wisely in precluding independent voters from participating in primary elections,
nor was it the role of the judicial department to determine whether the Republican
Party acted wisely in departing from this practice.' 19 Rather, a politically neutral
analysis of the rights of both parties to the suit led the Court to once again articulate an
expansive right of free association to be enjoyed by political parties.
C. AssociationalRights and the Modern Open Primary:
California Democratic Party v. Jones
In 1996, the electorate of California passed Proposition 198 by direct initiative.120
Supported by an overwhelming majority of the populace, Proposition 198 effectively
ended the closed primary system previously employed by California-in which only
registered members of a political party were eligible to vote in that party's primary

114. Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 210 (1986) (5-4 decision).
115. Id. at 214.
116. Id. at 210-11. In pertinent part, the statute provided that "[n]o person shall be permitted
to vote at a primary of a party unless he is on the last-completed enrollment list of such party."
Id. at 211 n.1.
117. Id. at 213 (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party, 599 F. Supp. 1228, 1238 (D. Conn.
1984), aft'd, 770 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 479 U.S. 208 (1986)) (alteration in original)
(omissions in original).
118. John R. Labbd, Comment, Louisiana'sBlanket PrimaryAfter California Democratic
Party v. Jones, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 721, 733 (2002). The Court rejected four proposed state
interests: limiting the administrative burdens presented by the inclusion of independent voters in
partisan primaries, preventing party raiding, avoiding voter confusion, and protecting the
integrity of the two-party system and the responsibility of party government. See Tashjian,479
U.S. at 217-25.
119. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 223.
120. Labbd, supranote 118, at 734.
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election-in favor of a blanket primary system of nominee selection.' 2' Under this
system, "all persons entitled to vote, including those not affiliated with any political
party, shall have the right to vote.., for any candidate regardless of the candidate's
political affiliation."' 122 The candidate of each party "who receives the highest number
of votes at a primary
election" then becomes the nominee of that party at the ensuing
23
general election. 1
After the passage of Proposition 198, four of the state's recognized political
parties-the California Democratic Party, the California Republican Party, the
Libertarian Party of California, and the Peace and Freedom Party-brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, alleging primarily
that the blanket primary system recently adopted by the voters interfered with the
parties' constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association. 124 Although the district
court concluded that the blanket primary "imposes a significant but not severe burden"
on the associational rights of parties, 125 a decision that was affirmed and adopted
verbatim by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court was not willing to
26
similarly constrict the rights of political parties. 1
In finding that the system of primary elections put into effect by Proposition 198
violated the First Amendment principles established by such cases as La Follette and
Tashjian, Justice Scalia's majority opinion declared that "Proposition 198 forces
political parties to associate with... those who, at best, have refused to affiliate with
the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival.' ' 127 The Court reiterated
the somewhat obvious conclusion that "a corollary of the right to associate is the right
not to associate"' 128 and, in keeping with its jurisprudential tradition, balanced the
parties' associational rights against the asserted state interests in regulating primary
elections in this manner.' 29 Ultimately, the Court found the provisions of Proposition

121. Id. at 734-35.
122. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2001 (West 1996) (repealed 2000).
123. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 15451 (West 2003).
124. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1293-94 (E.D. Cal. 1997),
aff'd, 169 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
125. Id. at 1300-01.
126. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
127. Id. at 577. The Court proceeded to distinguish California's blanket primary from both
the closed primary, implemented by California prior to 1996, and the open primary,
implemented by numerous other states. Id. at 577 & n.8. Regarding the closed primary system,
Justice Scalia noted that "even when it is made quite easy for a voter to change his party
affiliation the day of the primary, and thus, in some sense, to 'cross over,' at least he must
formally become a member ofthe party .
"d.
I.." at 577 (emphasis in original). Proving less
willing to distinguish the blanket primary from an open primary system, Justice Scalia quoted at
length from Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in La Follette before concluding that "[t]his
case does not require us to determine the constitutionality of open primaries." Id. at 577 n.8.
128. Id. at 574.
129. See id. at 572-86. After analyzing the blanket primary's infringement on party
autonomy, the Court systematically rejected seven proposed state interests as insufficient to
justify the implementation of a blanket primary system: (1) producing elected officials who
better represent the electorate, (2) affording voters more choice, (3) providing an effective vote
to disenfranchised voters, (4) increasing voter participation, (5) expanding debate, (6) protecting
voter privacy, and (7) promoting fairness. See id. at 582-86. For a detailed version of these

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:753

198 too burdensome
on the parties' associational freedom to constitute appropriate
30
state regulation.'
Despite this ruling, the Court did articulate several areas related to the electoral
system in which the First Amendment rights of political parties do not trump the state's
regulatory interests. It is, for example, "too plain for argument" that a state may require
parties to conduct primary elections in order to select their nominees.' 3' Similarly,
states may impose barriers to the ballot access of parties that lack "a significant
modicum of support."132 However, the processes through which political parties select
their nominees, despite the likely effect of these processes on the social and
institutional framework of33society, are not wholly public affairs subject to free and
intensive state regulation.
The invalidation of California's partisan blanket primary notwithstanding, the Court
manifested the likely constitutionality of a nonpartisanblanket primary. Justice Scalia
detailed the contours of such a system:
[U]nder [the nonpartisan blanket primary], the State determines what
qualifications it requires for a candidate to have a place on the primary ballot ....
Each voter, regardless of party affiliation, may then vote for any candidate, and the
top two vote getters (or however many the State prescribes) then move on to the
general election. This system has all the characteristics of the partisan blanket
primary, save the constitutionally crucial one: Primaryvoters are not choosing a
party's nominee.134

Thus, the Court carved out an exception to its holding in Jones that appeared to render
constitutional the
primary system maintained by the State of Louisiana for the past
35
three decades.'
The primary system in Jones was deemed unconstitutional because of the manner in
which it would operate, not because of the manner in which it was chosen. Thus, while
the Court did find relevant the fact that-under the provisions of Proposition 198unregistered primary voters would have the power to elect a party's nominee, no

arguments, see Brief for Respondents at 39-47, Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567
(2000) (No. 99-401).
130. Jones, 530 U.S. at 581-82 ("Proposition 198 forces petitioners to adulterate their
candidate-selection process.., by opening it up to persons wholly unaffiliated with the party.
Such forced association has the likely outcome ... of changing the parties' message. We can
think of no heavier burden on a political party's associational freedom.").
131. Id. at 572 (quoting Am. Party ofTex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 572-73. Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, argued that "an election, unlike a
convention or caucus, is a public affair." Id. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See also id. at 595 n.5. The majority concedes the public nature of an election, but argues that
"when an election determines a party's nominee it is a party affair as well, and ... the
constitutional rights of those composing the party cannot be disregarded." Id. at 573 n.4.
134. Id. at 585-86 (emphasis added).
135. See Ramaley, supra note 95, at 230. For an argument that Louisiana's blanket primary
is distinguishable from the system endorsed by the Jones Court, see Labb6, supra note 118, at
748-50 (suggesting that, despite the brief discussion in Jones, Louisiana's primary system "is
not clearly constitutional").
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special relevance was attached to the fact that the legislation mandating a partisan
blanket primary was passed through direct initiative.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE SELECTION OF A SYSTEM OF

PRIMARY ELECTIONS THROUGH DIRECT DEMOCRACY

This Note focuses on the interplay between two relatively recent electoral
innovations. Although the United States Supreme Court has addressed, to one degree
or another, the legality of various manifestations of each system-the system of
initiative and referendum that has come to occupy the political mentality of numerous
states, and the system of primary elections that has become vital to the nominating
process itself-the courts have never addressed the specific interaction between these
two systems as a question worthy of separate constitutional consideration. The
remainder of this Note addresses the following contention: assumingthat the initiative
process is not directly judiciable, and assuming that a state's system of primary
elections is not itself unconstitutional, there is something uniquely problematic about
the utilization of the direct initiative in order to effect a change in the structure of a
state's primary elections.
In proceeding, it is important to distinguish between normative arguments, which
generally concentrate themselves on the wisdom of a given electoral system, and legal
arguments, which focus instead on the constitutional ramifications present in the
system itself. While the difference is occasionally subtle-and the ensuing analysis
likely one of degree-the focus of this Note is on the actual legality of selecting a
system of primary elections through the advent of direct democracy.
As of 2001, thirteen states and the District of Columbia employed a traditional
closed primary system. 36 Thirteen additional states employed a modified version of the
closed primary system in which unaffiliated citizens are permitted to vote. 13 7 Of the
remainder, twenty states employed one version or another of the open primary system,
and four utilized a blanket primary to determine which candidates advance to the
38
general election.1
After the Supreme Court's decision in Jones invalidated California's blanket
primary, the voters of that state sent to the ballot an initiative modeled after the
Louisiana nonpartisan blanket primary that was specifically exempted from
constitutional nullification by the Jones Court. 139 While California does not present the
only occasions in which primary systems were determined by the electorate as a
whole, 140 this Note focuses on the specific initiatives of California as a telling example

136. Ramaley, supra note 95, at 219.
137. Id.
138. Id. The four states employing a blanket primary were Alaska, California, Louisiana, and
Washington, although California's primary was deemed unconstitutional in Jones, and Alaska,
which possessed a similar primary scheme, was subsequently forced to abandon its electoral
system. See Labb6, supra note 118, at 741-42.

139.

See CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, VOTER CHOICE OPEN PRIMARY ACT, CALIFORNIA PROPOSITION

62 (2004).
140. See, e.g., INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., 1998 ELECTION POST-ELECTION REPORT,
tbl.2.2.1998 (Sept. 2, 2002), availableat http://iandrinstitute.org (under "IRI Reports" choose
"1998 General Election") (indicating that in 1998 Arizona passed Proposition 103, which
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for two reasons. First, California has resorted to the initiative system to alter its
electoral scheme repeatedly, and the presence of an active advocacy system in the state
increases the likelihood that similar future initiatives will be submitted to the
electorate. Second, the most recent initiative intended to alter the state's electoral
system would have done so in such a way that appears to pass First Amendment
muster, and thus presents an opportunity to study a primary election proposition that
would most likely not be invalidated on grounds independent of the manner in which it
was chosen.
This section presents three separate reasons that the legality of an initiative altering
the structure of a state's primary elections should be severely questioned. First, the size
and substance of political parties is such that parties should be deemed a minority
culture in American society, and their rights should therefore be protected against
blatant majoritarianism in the tradition of Hunter v. Erickson. Second, the pure
complexity of legislation dealing with the intricacies ofa state's electoral infrastructure
suggests that such legislation should not be relegated to popular rule. And third,
permitting independent voters and members of other parties a voice in determining the
shape of a party's primary elections effectively-and unconstitutionally-grants the
electorate as a whole the power to establish the extent of political parties' associational
freedoms. Implicit in each of these arguments is the desire to infect American
lawmaking witha what Justice Hans Linde referred to as "standards of representative
deliberation."'' 4
A. PoliticalParties,Primary Elections, and Majoritarianism
In February of 1995, more than a year before the passage of Proposition 198,
slightly more than eighty-six percent of registered voters in California were members
of one of the two major political parties. 142 By 2003, the proportion of registered
members of the major political parties had dropped to 78.6%. 143 Over the same time
period, the percentage of registered voters unaffiliated with any party rose by more
than five percent.'44 Indeed, the Jones Court noted that the total number of votes cast
for candidates in the first primary elections after the implementation of California's
blanket primary system was, in some races, "more than double the total number of

allowed "any registered voter in the state to vote in a partisan primary election"). In 2003, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated Arizona's open primary law as violative of political
parties' First Amendment rights of association. See Ariz. Libertarian Party v. Bayless, 351 F.3d
1277 (9th Cir. 2003).
141. See Linde, supra note 32, at 724.
142.

CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, STATE PROPOSITIONS ON THE MARCH

1996 BALLOT:

PROPOSITION

198 (1996), available at http://www.sen.ca.gov/sor/REPORTS/REPORTS BY YEAR/
1996/PROP198.TXT. Forty-nine percent of Californians were members of the Democratic
Party, thirty-seven percent were members of the Republican Party, and smaller proportions
belonged to the American Independent Party, the Green Party, the Libertarian Party, and the
Peace and Freedom Party. Id. Over ten percent of registered voters refused to register with any
political party. Id.
143. See CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, REPORT OF REGISTRATION: HISTORICAL REGISTRATION
STATISTICS 2 (Feb. 10, 2003), available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/ror/regstats_02-1 0-

03 .pdf#search='california%20political%20party/o20registration.
144. See id.
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registeredparty members."'145 In no election over the past decade and a half has the
proportion of voters registered
with any one political party constituted a majority of
46
California's electorate.'
The fact that the majoritarian determination of a state's system of primary elections
necessarily affects associations comprised of a minority ofthe electorate should not go
unnoticed, for this tradition of permitting a democratic majority to establish the scope
of minority rights was the precise practice condemned by the Supreme Court in Hunter
v. Erickson.147 An astute critic will readily observe that Hunter involved the barriers to
racial equality that the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has long since
considered especially heinous, but the Court's pronouncement was given greater
breadth by its subsequent decision in Romer v. Evans.148The Romer Court, although
somewhat tacitly, applied the Hunter doctrine to majoritarian legislation limiting the
rights of homosexuals, a group that has not received the same historical protections as
have racial minorities.
In addition to comprising a minority of the electorate, racial minorities and
homosexuals also generally comprise a minority of the state's legislative body. This
marginalization does not exist in the case ofpolitical parties. Despite the fact that more
than twenty percent of California's voters no longer identify with either major political
49
party, the state assembly consists exclusively of Democrats and Republicans.
Consequently, legislation affecting a party's electoral scheme that is passed through
traditional republican methods-as opposed to legislation passed through the devices
of direct democracy-likely does not present the same majoritarian concerns as does
legislation affecting other minority groups. Regulatory schemes passed by the state
legislature, therefore, are usually enacted with the advice and consent of the parties
themselves. In this manner, political parties generally possess the power to dictate the
parameters of their own electoral institutions. When the Louisiana state legislature
adopted the nonpartisan blanket primary system
in 1975, for example, it did so with the
50
acquiescence of the state's political parties.
One commentator, in arguing for a hard judicial look at some laws passed by
initiative, claimed that "direct democracy bypasses internal safeguards designed to
filter out or negate factionalism, prejudice, tyranny, and self-interest."' 5 1The proper
method of compensating for these "process defects" is not, like some suggest, 152 an
increased resort to the initiative; rather, Professor Eule of the University of California

145. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 578 (2000) (emphasis in original).
146. See CAL. PROP. 198, at 2.
147. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
149. See CL. STATE ASSEMBLY, ASSEMBLY MEMBER LISTING, http://www.assembly.ca.gov/
acs/acsframeset7text.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
150. Labbd, supranote 118, at 743, 746. As a result of the parties' acquiescence, Louisiana's
blanket primary has never been challenged on the grounds that the system violates political
parties' First Amendment rights of free association. Id.at 745-46.
151. Eule, supra note 22, at 1549.
152. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, PartiesTake the Initiative (And Vice Versa), 100 COLuM.
L. REV. 731, 746 (2000) ("The parties' ultimate success in the area of party regulation...
depends upon taking their case to the people.").
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at Los Angeles suggests that the judiciary itself must "serve as the first line of defense
for minority interests."'' 53 The government, says Eule,
has an obligation to all of its citizens; the rights of individuals and minority groups
must be protected against the actions of the majority. The Constitution seeks to
enforce this obligation by (i) investing primary lawmaking authority in
representatives rather than the people themselves; (ii) dividing the power of the
lawmakers so that each unit may check the others;
4 and (iii) placing certain
principles beyond the reach of ordinary majorities.1
The relevant question in determining whether a specific issue is fit for the process of
popular decision making is not whether an issue is capable of garnering sufficient
public support to pass at the ballot-box; rather, the relevant question is "whether a
system of deliberative, checked-and-balanced representative government lessens the
probability that minority interests will be neglected, undervalued, or invaded."' 55 The
legislative process, despite its occasional shortcomings, affords minority groupsespecially, for obvious reasons, the political parties-a role that they lack in a system
of direct democracy.
By acknowledging the minority role that political parties have come to play in the
otherwise majoritarian system of contemporary America, any student versed in the
intricacies of electoral law should be able to reach the conclusion that regulating
parties through direct democracy is, at least, constitutionally problematic. At most, the
system, unquestionably violative of the principles of representative deliberation, is
downright unconstitutional.
B. PoliticalParties,Primary Elections, and Complexity of Legislation
Most of the legal bases for insisting that legislators--either members of the
legislative body or, in the case of direct democracy, the electorate-exhibit a minimum
level of institutional competence are embodied in state statutory enactments. The
single-subject rules implemented by some states, for example, have restricted the scope
15 6
of proposed legislation in such a manner as to promote intelligible lawmaking.
Similarly, most states have enacted statutes limiting the participatory rights of specific
members of the electorate in an otherwise democratic system. 57 Although electoral
specifics are generally not the province of the federal government, the United States
Constitution nonetheless designates certain minimum qualifications that a person must
meet before he or she is deemed competent to vote. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment
does, after all, prohibit citizens less than eighteen years of age from attaining suffrage.

153. Eule, supra note 22, at 1549.
154. Id. at 1548-49.
155. Id, at 1550.
156. See supra Part III.B.1.
157. See, e.g., ARiz. CONST. art. 7, § 2(c) (prohibiting any citizen "adjudicated an
incapacitated person" from voting); Tx. CONST. art. 6, § 1(a)(2) (prohibiting "persons who
have been determined mentally incompetent by a court" from voting); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2101
(West 2003) (prohibiting citizens "in prison or on parole for the conviction of a felony" from
voting).
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Thus, despite the guarantee of the Founders that "all men are created equal" and
"endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,"'' 5 8 a provision designed to
ensure that citizens possess rudimentary competence before participating in the
democratic system is at least somewhat ingrained in the Constitution.
It is the contention of this Note that the complexities involved in selecting a system
of primary elections are far too numerous and far too sizable for the electorate to be
considered sufficiently competent to tackle the issue. Proposition 62, the nonpartisan
blanket primary act that Californians sent to the ballot box in November of 2004,
totaled fifty-six pages.159 It contained ninety-five separate amendments to the state's
elections code, amended one article of the state constitution,
and would have
60
formalized seven additional sections of legislative text. 1
Proposition 62 was joined on the ballot by Proposition 60, a far simpler initiative
intended simply to reiterate a portion of the electoral system already in effect that
guaranteed a place on the general election ballot to the candidate of each party who
received the greatest number of votes at the primary election' 6' Neither initiative,
either by its own language or by the language of the legislative analysis provided to
voters, manifested the contradictory nature of the two proposals. If the electorate had
passed both initiatives, then a provision of California's state constitution would have
1 62
given effect only to the initiative with the highest number of affirmative votes.
However, the fact that only one of these initiatives passed presents its own intellectual
difficulties.
63
On November 2, 2004, Proposition 60 garnered 67.3% of the public's approval.
By comparison, Proposition 62 was only able to garner 45.7% of the vote. 64 Curious
for the purposes of this section, however, is not the proportion of the electorate that
supported either proposition; rather, the most profound observation that can be drawn
from the election results is that thirteen percent of the electorate apparently supported
both initiatives.165 How can it be said that a system of legislating meets Justice Linde's
"standards of representative deliberation" when sincere deliberation would surely have
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leading nominee of each political party is guaranteed a place on the general election ballot.
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disclosed a rudimentary hostility between two statutory proposals that was not
recognized by a million voters?
This Note does not pretend to achieve the level of vanity required to suggest that
people do not have the constitutional right to be stupid. However, certain procedural
protections against uninformed decision making-for example, laws that
disenfranchise minors, felons, or the mentally incompetent-have become so ingrained
in America's legal culture that the parallel between the common sense nature of these
protections and the need to prevent those ill-equipped to deal with complex legislation
from actually dealing with complex legislation is not frequently drawn. Nonetheless,
the telling example presented by California's recent election suggests that that portion
of society known somewhat ominously as "the people" may not be sufficiently adept at
deciding certain issues, such as the proper structure of a state's primary system.
C. PoliticalParties,PrimaryElections, and the Freedom of Association
In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, the Supreme Court affirmed a
political party's right to open its primary elections to independent voters. 166 A decade
and a half later, the Court manifested the party's corresponding right to prevent nonmembers from participating in its primary elections.167 In each of these cases-first in
Tashjian and subsequently in California Democratic Party v. Jones-regulatory
legislation affecting the rights of political parties was invalidated. The Court made it
clear not only that political parties possess First Amendment rights of association, but
also, despite the apparent public purpose of a state's elections, that these rights are
implicated by the parties' selection of an electoral scheme. In determining whether a
state regulation unnecessarily infringes upon the rights of the party, the Court has
associational rights against the state's interests in
generally balanced the party's
8
regulating party activity.16
In the case of the nonpartisan blanket primary of California's Proposition 62, the
state interests involved likely do not extend significantly further than the interests in
increasing voter participation and in nominating candidates representative of the
electorate that the Court found insufficient in Jones. 69 Nonetheless, while invalidating
the blanket primary of Proposition 198, the Jones Court appeared to carve out an
exception to its ruling for an electoral scheme similar to that of Proposition 62. But the
voters' selection of an alternative system of primary elections-regardless of the
constitutionality of the shape of that system--necessarily signals an end to the electoral
system in place before reformation. In that manner, the party's associational freedoms
are still jeopardized: whether the voters opt for a partisan or for a nonpartisan primary,
they have forced their collective voice, and their collective will, into the internal
operations of the political party.
If the right not to associate is a corollary of the right to associate, then surely a
political party's interest in not having the state dictate which electoral scheme it must
adopt should be considered interwoven with the party's interest in not having the state
dictate which electoral scheme it must jettison. Had Proposition 62 been enacted, not
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only would it have infused the nonpartisan blanket primary into California politics, but
it would have terminated the primary system favored by the state's political parties.
The electorate-that ominous whole comprised of numerous partisan factions-would
have effectively dictated the terms of primary elections to each party. Insofar as a
majority of the electorate qualifies as a "non-member" of any individual political party,
permitting the form of primary elections to be selected through the initiative process
resembles the precise intrusion into private affairs that was condemned by the Supreme
Court in both Tashjian and Jones. In essence, the state, through the electorate as a
to
whole, has forced political parties to associate with "those who, at best, have refused
'1 70
affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival."
Thus, despite the Court's-and the parties'-failure in Jones to address the fact that
Proposition 198 had been passed through the processes of direct democracy, it should
be clear that the Jones-Tashjianline of cases likely condemns the types of initiatives
that Californians have become accustomed to seeing on the ballot. As a practical
matter, however, the Court has given little indication-Hunter v. Erickson
notwithstanding-that it is prepared to invalidate legislation passed by the citizenry as
a whole simply because it was passed by the citizenry as a whole.
CONCLUSION

While both the processes of direct democracy and the rights of political parties have
been studied at length at nearly every level of legal, intellectual, and political
discourse, the interaction between these two populist innovations has scarcely been
broached. To no small extent, this Note has ignored most issues of public policy on
either side of the debate, opting instead to focus on the legal consequences inherent in
using the initiative process to limit the scope of freedoms traditionally enjoyed by
political parties. Any originalist interpretation of the Constitution, as it relates to this
issue, is necessarily futile, for the Founders anticipated neither popularly enacted
legislation nor the dominant role that political parties would come to play in our
society. Consequently, the regulation of partisan activities has become subject to the
Supreme Court's emerging First Amendment doctrine, the precise contours of which
are, as of yet, not entirely clear.
This Note has argued that the regulation of political parties through the initiative
process is constitutionally problematic, whether or not the state legislature could
permissibly enact similar legislation. The Constitution guarantees to the people a
republic, not a democracy-a government run by proxy, not a government run directly
by the people. Ironically, it was the perceived corruption over a century ago of this
representative government that led to the innovation of direct democracy in the first
place, an innovation that appears to have since become a mainstay in American
politics. At the same time as the popularity of direct democracy is steadily increasing,
however, both the strength and the size of political parties are on the decline. Rapidly
escalating numbers of independent and third-party voters have created an additional
incentive for citizens to limit the power of those partisan organizations that once
monopolized the political scene.
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Despite the somewhat romantic plea for an idealized version of democracy, the
Supreme Court can-and should-prevent the continued exploitation of the initiative
process to effect overtly majoritarian ends. Political parties, like direct democracy, are
a mainstay in American culture, and their rights, as organizations both legally and
morally worthy of protection, should extend somewhat further than our national
jurisprudence has heretofore permitted.

